The hybris of Socrates: A Platonic 'revaluation of values' in the Symposium by Desmond, William
The hybris of Socrates
The hybris of Socrates: A Platonic ‘revaluation of values’ in 
the Symposium
Will Desmond
Abstract:  In  the final  speech of  Plato’s  Symposium,  the  young,  aristocratic 
Alcibiades  accuses  Socrates  of  being  characteristically  hybristic.  This  is  a 
startling claim that requires explanation, in relation both to the rest of the 
Symposium and to Plato’s broader ethical and metaphysical concerns. Previous 
interpretations of the meaning and purpose of Alcibiades’ speech miss the 
main  point:  namely,  the  notion  of  a  philosphical  or  Socratic  hybris  
complements the discussion by Socrates-Diotima of the ideal nature of eros. 
Just as all desire in fact aims at eternal ends, so the Platonic philosopher acts 
‘hybristically’,  by  typically  asserting  his  own activity  and  insights  vis-à-vis 
temporal,  contingent  values.  Therefore,  Alcibiades’  speech  should  be 
understood in the context of a more general Platonic ‘revaluation of values’ 
that reorients traditional words and concepts towards ideal ends.
At  the  end  of  Plato’s  Symposium,  Alcibiades  bursts  into 
Agathon’s house and proceeds to deliver a speech in praise of 
Socrates.  It  is  a  deeply  ambivalent  speech.  Intermixed  with 
genuine admiration for Socrates’ moral virtues, intelligence and 
physical strength, is the recurrent and insistent condemnation of 
Socrates for hybris. Alcibiades levels the charge at the beginning 
of his speech when he compares Socrates to the satyr Marsyas: 
‘You  are  a  hybristes,  Socrates.  If  you  deny  it,  I  will  produce 
witnesses’. Alcibiades repeats this specific charge of hybris three 
times and peppers his speech with references to Socrates’ scorn 
(kataphronesis) and arrogance (hyperephania), as if these were typical 
characteristics of Socrates’ behaviour.1 Indeed, Alcibiades would 
1 The three accusations: Pl. Symp. 215b7, 219c5, 222a7-8. For similar language 
and concepts, see Symp. 216d7-e5, 217e4-5 (  
),  219c6 (     ), 
216d7-e2  (Socrates’  scorn  []  for  physical  beauty,  wealth, 
honour), 220b7-c1 (Socrates’ seeming  for the other soldiers 
at Potidaea). Diotima’s speech: Symp. 210b4-6 (  
      n   
      ); 
Symp.  210c3-6 (those who have seen the Form of Beauty consider bodily 
beauty a mere ).  Throughout, I refer to the Oxford Classical Text 
(ed. J. Burnet, 1967); all translations are my own.
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seem  to  present  a  general  portrait  of  the  man:  not  only 
Alcibiades, but also Charmides, Euthydemus and ‘many many 
others’  have  suffered  from  Socrates’  hybris.2 Alcibiades’ 
accusation is a complex one and a full explication would involve 
a proper understanding of hybris both in itself and in relation to 
Alcibiades’ speech, to the Symposium and even to Plato’s idealism 
as a whole. Unlike the interpretations of scholars like Gagarin, 
Nussbaum  and  Fisher,  I  will  here  argue  that  Alcibiades’ 
accusation  complements  Socrates’  speech  on  eros.  Namely, 
Socratic hybris becomes emblematic of a new moral outlook, and 
should be construed as one element in a more general Platonic 
‘revaluation  of  values’,  according  to  which  a  relative 
dishonouring of conventional attitudes is both a prelude to and 
consequence of wisdom.
Before developing this interpretation in more detail, let 
us briefly review some of the major work on the meaning of the 
term  hybris.  Here  two general  tendencies  emerge,  which have 
been well synthesized by D. Cairns. First, D. M. MacDowell, M. 
W. Dickie and others emphasize that  hybris  is a form of ‘high 
spirits’, a kind of rough self-assertion rising from an excess of 
energy. This interpretation emphasizes the lasting disposition of 
the hybristic agent, rather than any particular hybristic acts or 
intentions; hence, hybristes and hybristikos can be used to sum up 
a person’s whole character.3 Fisher, on the other hand, stresses 
the  intentional  aspect—in  particular  the  desire  to  belittle, 
demean and in some way dishonour another: for Fisher, hybris ‘is 
essentially the serious assault on the honour of another... [T]he 
typical motive for such infliction of dishonour is the pleasure of 
expressing a sense of superiority, rather than compulsion, need 
2 Pl. Symp. 222a-b
3 D. M. MacDowell, ‘Hybris in Athens’, Greece and Rome 23 (1976), pp. 14-31; 
M.W.  Dickie  in  Greek  Poetry  and  Philosophy:  Studies  in  Honour  of  Leonard  
Woodbury, ed. by D.E. Gerber (Chico, California: Scholars Press, 1984), pp. 
83-109; N.R.E. Fisher,  Hybris:  A Study in the Values of Honour and Shame in  
Ancient  Greece (Warminster Aris & Phillips,  1992),  pp.  3-5;  and D. Cairns, 
‘Hybris, Dishonour, and Thinking Big’,  Journal of Hellenic Studies, cxvi (1996), 
p.1 n.2 for a survey of other relevant literature. As a side-note, one must 
remember that the still-common view of hybris as ‘overweening presumption 
suggesting  impious  disregard of  the  limits  governing  human action in  an 
orderly universe’ (as defined by the 2002 edition of the Encyclopaedia Brittanica) 
is too narrow in its scope.
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or desire for wealth’.4 In accordance with this definition, Fisher 
demands  that  each  hybristic  act  have  some dishonoured victim, 
even if that victim is present only by implication. This demand 
can lead to a strained interpretation of some passages.5 Noting 
this, Cairns has argued for a synthesis of the two approaches: 
the pleasure of brusque self-assertion usually entails a disregard 
and dishonouring of others, though not always; MacDowell and 
Fisher  only  emphasize  different  aspects  of  the  same 
phenomenon.6 The degree to which Plato’s use of the term can 
deviate  from  conventional  usage  is  a  controversial  question. 
Fisher  treats  Platonic  use,  at  least  in  the  Phaedrus as  highly 
unusual, while Cairns cannot find any essential divergence from 
normal use. 
Neither,  however,  emphasizes  the  unusual  nature  of 
Alcibiades’  accusations  in  the  Symposium,  and  indeed  no 
interpreters  to  my  knowledge  (including  Gagarin)  have 
adequately  stressed  how  and  why  hybris  is  a  leitmotif  in  the 
dialogue as a whole. But hybris is present almost from beginning 
to  end:  the  attentive  reader  should  not  be  surprised  by 
Alcibiades’ seemingly sudden accusation.7 The theme is perhaps 
4 Fisher, p. 1 Cf. Fisher’s summary is worth quoting: ‘The center of attention 
in uses of hybris, the core of the concept, is beyond any doubt the committing 
of  acts  of  intentional  insult,  of  acts  which  deliberately  inflict  shame  and 
dishonour  on  others.  Sometimes  the  focus  of  interest  may  be  on  the 
dreadfulness of the intention of the agent, and its possible explanation in 
terms of his age, status, wealth, political stance or character; at others, it may 
be on the degree of shame inflicted. But in almost all cases the victim of the 
hybris is patently present in the context; where it can or has been doubted that 
there is a victim, in all cases it can be plausibly argued that one is supposed 
by the argument. No cases have been found where  hybris can plausibly be 
supposed  to  mean  no  more  than  high  spirits,  good fun,  overconfidence, 
pride, enjoying success or “thinking big”; nor is it  anywhere shown to be 
specifically a “religious” term, though, naturally, it can be used to condemn 
acts of outrage against the gods or their cult.’ (p. 148)
5 Such as Herodotus 2.32.3, discussed by Fisher, pp. 98-9
6 ‘Expressing one’s excess energy self-indulgently means placing oneself and 
one’s pleasure first, and thus losing sight of one’s status as one among others. 
Self-aggrandizement  constitutes  an  incursion  into  the  sphere  of  others’ 
honour, because the concept of honour is necessarily comparative’ (Cairns, p. 
32). I will follow Cairns’ conclusions here, while keeping Fisher’s stress upon 
hybris as deliberate dishonouring. 
7 Hybris  or its cognates occur eight times in the Symposium, at 174b6, 175e7, 
181c4, 188a7, 215b7, 219c5, 221e3-4, 222a8
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most  obvious  in  Aristophanes’  speech.  While  it  is  true  that 
Aristophanes does not use the word hybris itself, he does include 
many concepts and phrases related to the first understanding of 
hybris  as  gratuitous  self-assertion.  Thus,  Aristophanes  tells  a 
story  about  the  great  energy  (dynamis)  of  the  first  humans. 
‘Terrible  in their  strength and power’,  they  ‘thought  big’  and 
were  so  filled  with  riotousness  (aselgia)  that  they  stormed 
Olympus like the giants Otus and Ephialtes. To punish this act 
of  excessive  self-assertion,  Zeus  split  them  and  formed  the 
human  race,  with  all  the  peculiarities  of  its  present  shape, 
sexuality, longings and fulfillment. Thus, in Aristophanes’ vision, 
humanity  bears  the  scars  and  vestiges  of  an  ancient  hybris. 
Indeed, there is still a danger that this  hybris  might erupt again, 
for not all are temperate and self-restrained (kosmioi).8 
Less obvious, however, are the clues that thread through 
the dialogue. These suggest that hybris was a typical characteristic 
of  Socrates,  and  so  foreshadow  Alcibiades’  more  explicit 
accusations.  The  first  of  these  indications  is  at  the  very 
beginning of Apollodorus’ narrative. Socrates happens to meet 
Aristodemus, and as if acting on a momentary whim, he takes 
the  liberty  of  inviting  Aristodemus  to  Agathon’s  symposium: 
‘How would you feel about going uninvited to the dinner?’9 To 
bring  one’s  own  guests  to  a  symposium  was  not  the  ‘done 
thing’, particularly if the extra guests might not be welcome, and 
one wonders whether this was the case with Aristodemus. For 
as  Apollodorus  notes,  Aristodemus  was  one  of  the  more 
vehement  followers  of  Socrates  at  the  time,  always  going 
barefoot,  following  his  master  everywhere,  as  if  awaiting  his 
command.10 When this eccentric Socratic appears at the door, 
8 Strength, power and ‘thinking big’: Pl. Symp. 190b5-6. The phrase 
 or Plato’s     is a near synonym for 
hybris, as Cairns shows (pp. 10-7). : Symp. 190d4. Not all are 
: Symp. 193a3-5
9 Pl. Symp. 174a9-b1
10 Pl. Symp. 173b1-173b4 (    
      ).  Aristodemus appears as the literal 
‘follower’  of  Socrates  at  the  beginning  and  end  of  the  dialogue.  In  the 
beginning, he has reservations about going uninvited to the dinner, but is 
willing to do whatever Socrates orders (Symp. 174b2), or to go if ‘invited’ by 
Socrates (Symp. 174c7-d1). At the end of the dialogue, he wakes up to follow 
Socrates out, ‘as was his custom’ (223d8-10).
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Agathon welcomes him, saying that he had been searching for 
him the day before to extend an invitation, but could not find 
him.11 This  may  be  just  a  polite  fiction:  here,  as  elsewhere, 
Agathon is a gracious host, but one senses that in fact he did not 
invite Aristodemus. 
That  Socrates’  invitation is  an act  of  hybris is  not  left 
simply  to  the  reader’s  surmise,  however.  For  Socrates’  own 
banter  along  the  road12 suggests  that  he  is  indeed  acting 
hybristically in bringing Aristodemus. Quoting the saying, ‘the 
good go of their own accord to the feast of the good’, Socrates 
suggests that he and Aristodemus should, like Homer, ‘destroy’ 
and  ‘commit  hybris’  against  the  proverb.  For  Homer  makes 
Menelaus,  a  ‘soft  spearman’,  go  uninvited  ()  to  the 
feast  of  Agamemnon,  a  ‘man  good  at  war’.  Analogously, 
Socrates takes Aristodemus to the feast of Agathon, ‘the good’; 
Socrates’ Aristodemus is to Agathon as Homer’s Menelaus is to 
Agamemnon. If the proverb holds that the ‘worse’ should not 
go to the house of the ‘better’, then Menelaus should not go to 
the feast and sacrifice of Agamemnon. So too, by implication, 
Aristodemus  should  not  go  the  house  of  Agathon,  perhaps 
because Aristodemus would not be considered as  one of  the 
‘gentlemen’  (kaloi  kai  agathoi)  like  Pausanias  and  Agathon.  In 
fact,  Socrates  does  not  single  out  Aristodemus,  but  uses  the 
plural:  ‘let  us  destroy  the  proverb’,13 as  if  Socrates  were  also 
amused at the incongruity of  his attending this  soirée of  glitterati. 
Socrates has ‘prettified himself’ ) with a bath 
and slippers, so that he ‘might go, beautiful to the company of 
the  beautiful’.  There  may  be  a  wry  self-deprecation  in  these 
comments  of  Socrates,  particularly  given  the  widespread 
agreement on Socrates’  physical ugliness and Agathon’s good-
looks.14 But  on  the  other  hand,  Socrates’  repartee  may  also 
represent  a  lighthearted  challenge  to  conventional  categories: 
who  is  to  say  who  is  ‘beautiful’  and  ‘good’?  Who  has  the 
authority to invite guests to the party? With regard to this latter 
question,  Aristodemus  worries  about  what  ‘defense’  Socrates 
11 Pl. Symp. 174e4-a5 
12 Pl. Symp. 174b3-c4
13 Pl. Symp. 174b3-4
14 On Agathon’s beauty: Pl. Symp. 212e6-8, 213c4-5 
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might make for inviting him, but Socrates nonchalantly waves 
aside his anxieties with another cheery quotation to the effect 
‘We will  think of  something on the way there’,  and off  they 
march.15 
Socrates’  banter  about  committing  hybris against  the 
proverb might be passed over,  but for the fact  that  his  mild 
hybris appears again in the very next episode. Again, Agathon is 
the  main  victim.  After  inviting  Aristodemus,  Socrates  falls 
behind in the road and arrives late—very late, for the guests are 
already in the middle of dinner. He is late, of course, because he 
has been waylaid by a thought along the way; he stands there, as 
in trance, thinking it through. In the meantime, Agathon is left 
fretting,  and  we  see  him  turning  to  Aristodemus  repeatedly, 
worrying what he should do. Here, Socrates’ intellectual zeal has 
relatively minor consequences. Yet, given the broad scope of the 
word,  his  lateness might be plausibly  construed as a  form of 
mild  hybris:  here,  driven  by  great  intellectual  energy,  the 
philosopher asserts his own characteristic activity over against 
social  conventions,  to  the  discomfort,  even  dishonour,  of 
Agathon.  Here,  of  course,  any  dishonour  done  is  relatively 
minor, and the whole passage, again, might be unremarkable but 
for the fact that it is part of a pattern. Preceded by the invitation 
of Aristodemus, it is followed in the next episode by the first 
obvious instance of Socratic hybris. 
This  time,  the  word  is  introduced  explicitly,  even 
emphatically. Socrates has finally arrived, and Agathon calls him 
over to sit by his side, so that he ‘might get hold of him and get 
some  pleasure  from his  wise  insight’.  Agathon’s  remarks  are 
playfully suggestive, coy, flattering. Socrates’ response is equally 
coy,  but  satirical:  if  wisdom could  flow  from one  person  to 
another, then he would most gladly sit next to Agathon, for his 
wisdom is ‘radiant and filled with promise, having blazed forth 
so fiercely and so brightly yesterday, in the presence of more 
than thirty thousand of the Hellenes’. Socrates ostensibly praises 
Agathon, but his note of sublimity in the last sentence is too 
august  to  be  serious.  Agathon’s  first  triumph  before  a 
Panhellenic  audience  has  been  transmuted  into  something 
15 Pl. Symp. 174c7-d4
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vaguely ridiculous.16 Immediately noting the mockery, Agathon 
retorts briefly and somewhat jocularly, ‘You are a hybristes (
Socrates’.
It  is  true  that  one  should  not  over-interpret  this 
interchange. The term hybristes is used elsewhere in the Platonic 
corpus in a jocular, teasing fashion.17 But one should not glide 
over Agathon’s words either. After all, teasing can have a sharp 
edge and here it does: Agathon is brief and gracious, but he  is 
defending himself and the victory that Socrates has just slighted. 
Moreover, this is the first interchange between the two men—
hence a highly significant one and a foreshadowing of more to 
come. Plato leaves no doubt that this is foreshadowing, as in the 
next  sentence  Agathon promises  later  to  make  Dionysus  the 
arbiter  of  their  rival  claims to wisdom.  Later,  Dionysus  does 
indeed appear in the guise of Alcibiades, drunk and wreathed in 
ivy. This Alcibiades will crown Socrates over Agathon, while still 
reproaching Socrates with Agathon’s words—‘you are a hybristes, 
Socrates’;  again,  the words will  be  in  response to a  romantic 
slight.18
Before that, however, Socrates  hybristes  has a few other 
unruly and mildly hybristic moments, notably when his turn to 
praise Eros comes round. His speech as a whole, in its method 
and content,  should be seen as  an instance of  Socrates’  self-
assertion vis-à-vis the conventions of Phaedrus’ game, as well as 
conventional notions of Eros. First, Socrates’  speech contains 
some gratuitous attacks on the other symposiasts. In this regard, 
Socrates  is  not  alone:  in  keeping  with  the  conventionally 
agonistic  atmosphere  of  the  symposium,  the  speakers  refer 
16 The passage is  Pl.  Symp.  175c6-d2. Similar in tone is Socrates’  in  Symp. 
194a8-b5.  Cf.  Phdr.  234d1-8;  and  Menexenus 234c1-235c6 for  a  prolonged 
send-up  of  rhetoric  of  the  funeral  orations  (epitaphioi logoi).  For  a  similar 
comparison  of  the  words  of  Agathon  and  Alcibiades,  see  M.  Gagarin, 
‘Socrates’ Hybris and Alcibiades’ Failure’, Phoenix 31 (1977), 22-37 (p. 33).
17 Fisher warns against over-interpretation, noting ‘jocular’ uses of the word 
hybristes  in  Meno 76a,  Prot.  355c, and Euthyd. 273a (pp. 453-54).  But Fisher 
misses the strategic placing of Agathon’s reproach, the many other examples 
of  Socrates’  hybristic  behavior  through  the  Symposium,  as  well  as  the 
generalizing tendency of Alcibiades’ speech at the end: contrary to Fisher, 
these do in fact ‘justify the conclusion that Socrates is regularly hybristic’ (p. 
465).
18Alcibiades first crowns Agathon’s ‘wisest and most beautiful head’, but then 
transfers the honours to Socrates’ ‘amazing brow’: Pl. Symp. 212e3-213e6
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critically  to  their  rivals,  either  by  name,  or  by  asserting  the 
superiority  of  their  own  approach.19 But  Socrates  raises  this 
rhetoric of self-assertion to a new pitch. First, he prefaces his 
speech  with  extensive  remarks  that  essentially  depict  all the 
other speakers as flatterers.  Socrates thought that the speech-
making would involve simply telling the  truth about  eros,  but 
now he realizes that an encomium is successful to the degree 
that  it  includes  all  manner  of  fine  phrases  and  empty 
compliments. Socrates would alone speak the truth, and make 
truth his praise. The implication is that  nothing worthwhile has 
been said all evening. He threatens not to participate at all unless 
given complete freedom to speak in his own manner.20 
The  other  symposiasts  are  quick  to  oblige,  little 
suspecting that Socrates would proceed to submit Agathon to 
the  grilling  of  an  elenchus.  After  the  barrage  of  questions, 
Agathon meekly confesses that in fact Eros is not beautiful, and 
that he ‘knew nothing about what he was talking about’. ‘And 
yet’,  Socrates  replies  in  this  awkward  moment,  ‘at  least  you 
spoke beautifully, Agathon’.21 So Socrates gently twists the knife, 
depicting Agathon as a naive orator, a mere poet who mouths 
words thoughtlessly, as if Agathon were simply filled with empty 
bombast.  Throughout  this  interchange,  Socrates’  tone  is 
characteristically  polite  and  measured.  But  this  should  not 
distract one from what has happened: essentially, Socrates has 
ridiculed  Agathon’s  fine  speech,  discomfited  a  host  before 
guests in his own house, belittled the craft of a poet who has 
just  won the state’s  highest  artistic  honors;  he has summarily 
dismissed the many classical representations of Eros as a young, 
19 Thus,  Pausanias  criticizes  Phaedrus  for  his  univocal  account  of  Eros 
(180c3-d3). Eryximachus proclaims that Pausanias made a good start, but it 
requires  the  superior  knowledge  of  medicine  to  bring  the  argument  to 
completion (185e6-b2). Aristophanes does not refer to the other symposiasts, 
but  makes  the  general  criticism  that  mankind  as  a  whole  has  not  yet 
recognized  the  power  of  the  god.  Agathon similarly  mentions  no  names 
when  he  claims  that  none  of  the  former  speakers  have  praised  the  god 
himself (194e5-195a1).
20 Pl. Symp. 198c5-199b5
21 Pl. Symp. 201c1 (       ). Note 
the limiting (a beautiful speech, but nothing more), and the emphatic 
introducing a point ‘deserving special attention’ (Liddell & Scott, Greek-
English Lexicon, 9th Edition).
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beautiful god. This then is Socrates’ most egregious act of hybris 
that evening. Yet he seems untroubled by any sense of social 
impropriety.  He  proceeds  on  with  calm  imperturbability, 
unceremoniously dropping Agathon22 in order to move onto his 
main argument.
In the course of this argument, Socrates levels a cheap 
blow at his other main contender, Aristophanes. Through the 
voice of his Diotima, he states that nobody desires their other 
half: wholeness or bodily integrity are desired only if good or if 
seemingly good, and there are instances of people cutting off 
hands  and  feet  if  these  seem  harmful.23 Such  a  ‘counter- 
example’ is hardly a generous response to Aristophanes’ myth, 
and afterwards, Aristophanes is about to respond. Might he too 
have retorted,  ‘You are a  hybristes,  Socrates’?  We do not hear 
Aristophanes’ response, for just then Alcibiades bursts in. But 
like Aristophanes, Alcibiades will praise a type of romantic love 
between two individuals. Like the comedian, his intention is not 
to raise a laugh, but to speak the truth. Such parallels between 
the two speeches suggest that at one level, Alcibiades may speak 
for Aristophanes.24
In any case, Alcibiades certainly does call  attention to 
hybris  as a  general characteristic of Socrates’ behaviour. To sum 
up  the  strangeness  of  this  philosophical  creature,  Alcibiades 
resorts to mythical images. Socrates cannot be compared with 
any one individual living or dead, Pericles or Nestor, Brasidas or 
Achilles.  Instead,  Socrates  is  like  a  satyr,  silenus  or  Marsyas 
himself.  There  are  several  points  implicit  in  the  comparison. 
Like  the  satyrs,  Socrates  is  ugly.  Like  the  hollowed  silenus-
figures, he has many layers—great inner depth. Like the flute-
playing Marsyas, Socrates is a master-musician who can enthrall 
by force of words alone.25 Finally, Socrates is as hybristic as a 
22 Symp. 201d1:      .
23 Pl. Symp. 205d10-206a2
24 This  parallel  is  drawn  also  by  M.  Nussbaum,  The  Fragility  of  Goodness 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 171 and Fisher, p. 460.
25 One notes that Alcibiades does not call attention to the hybris of Marsyas 
who challenged Apollo in music, lost and was flayed. Is there a ‘religious’ 
hybris in Socrates’ assertion that mortals can know the highest realities? The 
traditionally  pious  might  see  this  as  a  violation of  the  Delphian  Apollo’s 
commands ‘know thyself’ and ‘nothing overmuch’: mortality must be content 
with little, e.g with empirical particulars. Marsyas-Socrates is not thus content, 
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satyr.  The  satyrs  were  wild,  lawless  beings,  filled  with  a 
potentially  violent  sexuality.  The  typical  satyr  of  vases  and 
paintings rushes after the maenad, who ever flees his embraces. 
Filled  with  excessive  energy,  careless  of  the  honour  of  their 
virgin prey, satyrs are paragons of  hybris.26 Alcibiades’ simile is 
particularly  striking  given  that  through  the  Symposium,  as 
elsewhere in the Platonic corpus, Socrates is depicted as a highly 
erotic creature. In the  Charmides, it is a physical  eros that surges 
forth when he sees inside Charmides’ cloak. In the Symposium, it 
is philosophical desire that Socrates exemplifies: he knows only 
ta erotika;  the young men clamor to recline near this seductive 
sage; and in Socrates’ own allegory of Poros and Penia, he seems 
to  add  some  autobiographical  touches,  for  his  Eros  is,  like 
himself, bare-footed, poor, a schemer and ‘sophist’ ever seeking 
the heavenly ‘wealth’ that is his true inheritance and reward.27 
Alcibiades’ comparison, then, has great resonance as a 
depiction of the Platonic Socrates. His brief accusation becomes 
even  more  fraught  with  implication,  however,  when  one 
concentrates  on  the  paradox  that  it  is  Alcibiades  who  here 
accuses Socrates of hybris. For Alcibiades was notorious among 
contemporaries as being the personification of hybris and eros. In 
his  Memorabilia Xenophon  states  categorically  that  Alcibiades 
was ‘the most hybristic’ of the Athenians,28 a description that 
might  have  been  corroborated  by  Plutarch,  writers  of  the 
Academy,  Thucydides  and many others.  Certainly,  Alcibiades’ 
reputation for  hybris  seems to have been well-deserved.  After 
and evokes the demand, so central to Dionysiac and Orphic thought, that 
one be unified with the divine—even that one become the god. This may be 
implicit in Alcibiades’  accusation,  but one must remember that Alcibiades 
focuses on Socrates’  hybris towards him, in the human world, not any  hybris 
vis-à-vis the divine.
26 Fisher, p. 121 (‘Satyrs, notorious for general insolence and drunken rapes, 
are naturally often held to be hybristic’), citing F. Lissarrague in Nothing to Do 
with Dionysos? Athenian Drama in Its Social Context, ed. by J.W. Winkler and F.I. 
Zeitlin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 234. 
27 Charmides,  155d-e.  Socrates as   :  Pl.  Symp.  177d7-8, 
193e4-7,  198d1-2;  cf.  201d5,  207c2-4,  209e5-210a1  (his  lessons  from the 
expert Diotima), 216d2-3. 
28 Mem. 1.2.12. See esp. Thuc. 6.15, [And.] 4 passim, Plutarch, Alc. 4, 8, 12, 16 
etc., and Fisher, pp. 87-88, 108, 148-150 for many anecdotes. For a more 
general portrait of the man, see D. Dribble,  Alcibiades and Athens (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1999). 
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marrying,  Alcibiades  brought  concubines  into  the  house  and 
would beat his wife; when the woman went to the magistrate to 
file for a divorce, he carried her away bodily across the agora and 
the  city—a  terrible  humiliation  for  her,  and  her  family.  An 
arrogant  aristocrat,  he  insulted  and  struck  people  with  little 
provocation.  In  his  exile  from Athens,  rumor  had  it  that  he 
seduced the wife of one of the Spartan kings—an act of  hybris  
not only against the king’s family and to Sparta, but also to the 
king qua host, and to the sacred and universal laws of hospitality. 
Such acts of private  hybris  were matched by public ones. As is 
often noted, the dramatic setting for the Symposium is during the 
Lenaea festival  in  January-February,  416:  this  is  a  year  before 
three  major  events,  all  linked  by  Plato’s  contemporaries  to 
Alcibiades—the mutilation of  the  Hermes,  the  devastation of 
Melos, and the invasion of Sicily. All three were seen by many as 
acts  of  hybris,  unprovoked self-assertion  over  and against  the 
honour of others: as contemporary rhetoric had it, the invasions 
were  an  attempt  to  ‘enslave’  Syracuse,  Melos  and  other 
communities;  the  mutilation  of  the  Hermes  was  an  insult  to 
Hermes, as well as to the individual householders upon whose 
property  these  statues  were  erected.29 There  were  also 
accusations that Alcibiades along with others had mocked the 
rites of the Eleusinian Mysteries in a symposium—hybris against 
Demeter  and  the  gods,  as  well  as  to  Athens,  keeper  of  the 
Mysteries.30 Such charges led directly to Alcibiades’ flight from 
Athens, his treason, and the crucial advice that turned the war in 
Sparta’s favour. All this lay in the very near future, and so the 
setting of the dialogue January 416 is a poignant one. Alcibiades 
the  hybristic  is  soon to outdo himself in his crimes against the 
gods, foreign states and Athens. 
Needless  to  say,  all  this  is  touched upon very  lightly, 
evoked rather than stated explicitly. Plato refers briefly to a few 
salient facts: the drunken revelry (komos) with companions, the 
banging at the door, the voice of a flute-girl, Alcibiades crashing 
into  Agathon’s  house,  disrupting  the  civilized  speech-making 
with  his  antics,  his  confrontation  with  Socrates,  his  ‘satyric 
speech’ by which he seems intent somehow on picking a fight, 
29 In  fact,  Alcibiades  may  not  have  been  explicitly  associated  with  the 
mutilation of the Hermes until the next generation. 
30 Thuc. 6.28.1-2, Dem. 21.143, Plut. Alc. 18; cf. Fisher, p. 145.
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the resumption of hard drinking. This is stereotypical behavior 
for  an  aristocratic  symposium:  after  some  hard  drinking  and 
perhaps political intrigue, the symposiasts would spill onto the 
street looking to bully their ‘inferiors’.31 But rather than offering 
a catalogue of lurid details, Plato includes just enough to call to 
mind the vice that was so strongly associated with Alcibiades’ 
name—his mania for honour, his disregard for others’ honour, 
his self-aggrandizement, in a word, his hybris.
This association makes Alcibiades’ accusation a stunning 
one.  For here it  is Alcibiades,  hybris  personified,  who accuses 
Socrates  of  being  a  hybristes.  This  accusation  is  all  the  more 
startling because it overturns the normal link of hybris with three 
groups—the powerful,  rich,  and young.32 Alcibiades is  young, 
Socrates  relatively  old.  Alcibiades  is  rich,  Socrates  barefooted 
and relatively poor. Alcibiades is near the height of his political 
power; Socrates has not yet been to court even once—strange 
for an Athenian—and rarely takes an active part in the assembly. 
Furthermore, Alcibiades was known for his personal beauty—
tall,  strong,  handsome,  charismatic.  Socrates  too has his  own 
charisma, but he is short, pot-bellied and ugly. All the normal 
categories  seem  reversed:  young,  rich,  powerful  Alcibiades 
accuses Socrates, old, poor and powerless of hybris.
Yet the paradoxical quality of Alcibiades’ accusation has 
a further layer. For Socrates’  hybris  is due, of all things, to his 
temperance and self-restraint (sophrosune).33 Alcibiades claims to 
have been led to believe by Socrates that they might be lovers. 
When  Socrates  made  no  moves  towards  a  traditional 
homosexual  partnership,  Alcibiades  took  the  initiative.  His 
advances  were  ignored,  leaving  Alcibiades  feeling  jilted  and 
despised. And so, Socrates, he says, is guilty of  hybris  towards 
me: leading me on, then mocking me, cultivating my friendship, 
then scorning my offers, treating me just like any other.  Hybris  
could be contrasted with  sophrosune,  especially by Plato in later 
31 On  hybris  associated with the symposium, and Plato’s disdain for vulgar 
symposia (as Prot. 347c-e, Theaet. 173d), see Fisher, pp. 100-102.
32 See Lysias 24; Aristotle,  Rhet. 1378b23-34; Fisher, esp. pp. 19-21, 96-104, 
and 497 (‘in almost all our texts hybris is seen as above all the fault of the rich 
and powerful’).
33 Cf. Fisher, ‘This is the central oxymoron of the speech; the extreme of 
sophrosyne is seen as a form of hybris’ (p. 462n.43); Gagarin, pp. 30-32.
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dialogues.34 In the Phaedrus, for instance, hybris is defined as the 
excessive  and  irrational  desire  for  bodily  pleasure;  the  dark 
horse, emblematic of the appetite faculty, is repeatedly described 
as hybristic.35 Given this typical association, what does it mean 
to say that Socrates in his  sophrosune is a  hybristes? How can a 
virtue be almost synonymous with its opposing vice? 
There  have  been  at  least  three  major  responses  to 
Alcibiades’  accusation.  Two  would  tend  to  corroborate 
Alcibiades’  perspective:  Socrates  is  hybristic and  should  be 
censured for it. The third gives an essentially political explication 
of  Plato’s  purposes  in  composing  this  last  speech.  Gagarin’s 
approach,  firstly,  would  tend  to  locate  Socrates’  hybris  in  the 
context of his pedagogy, particularly the elenchus. The elenchus has 
the  negative  aim of breaking  inherited  prejudices,  exposing a 
student’s relative ignorance, and goading him out of any former 
intellectual  complacency.  Only  when  stung  by  refutation  and 
self-contradiction can the student progress to reconstruct beliefs 
with  greater  knowledge  and  self-awareness.  But,  Gagarin 
suggests,  Socrates’  pedagogy  failed  in  Alcibiades’  case:  his 
treatment of students was hurtful,  high-handed, and only had 
the effect of driving Alcibiades away from philosophy and its 
gentle  ideals.  Therefore,  the  political  crimes  of  Alcibiades,  as 
well  as  his  failure  as  a  philosopher,  are  ‘in  part  traceable  to 
Socrates’  and  should  be  seen  as  ‘a  direct  result  of  Socrates’ 
hybris’.36 
Nussbaum  also  tends  to  disapprove  of  Socrates’ 
behaviour. For her, Alcibiades’ speech is a profound reminder 
of the intimacy and fragility of love, and of the fact that true 
love is the fascination and devotion of two individuals for each 
other. Thus, the  eros  of Socrates and Diotima is an excessively 
intellectual  affair  that  subsumes  individual  beauty  under  the 
category of some universal, ‘homogeneous’ Beauty. Alcibiades is 
more human and believable: he speaks his love for Socrates in 
34 See Fisher, pp. 111-117, 458-492 and esp. 491: in Plato, hybris ‘becomes a 
full contrary to all aspects of self-control or  sophrosune—something which it 
does on locations show signs of doing in other fourth-century authors, but 
nowhere else to anything like the same extent’.
35 Pl. Phdr. 254c3, 254e1; cf. Fisher, pp. 467-76
36 Gagarin, p. 34. My summary of Gagarin’s argument stresses the  elenchus 
more than Gagarin himself does.
Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society 2005
55
Will Desmond
all his strangeness (atopia) and sheer individuality. Socrates, on 
the  other  hand,  cannot  deal  with  the  individual  without  the 
mediation of some more impersonal idea. But the body is often 
the  source  and  locus  of  individuality.  Hence,  in  rejecting 
Alcibiades’ bodily advances, Socrates rejects Alcibiades himself. 
His inability to return Alcibiades’ love is a real failing. Here he 
not  only  dishonours  Alcibiades,  he  dishonours  our  deepest 
intuitions: his is a  hybris  that Alcibiades rightly condemns and 
that Plato, through Alcibiades, would seek to mitigate.37
Differing from both Nussbaum and Gagarin is Fisher, 
who takes a more traditional line in arguing that Plato sought to 
exonerate Socrates posthumously from all  creeping rumors of 
corrupting the youth and undermining the Athenian democracy: 
‘Plato is clearly offering a brilliant type of “explanation” of the 
failure  of  Socrates’  most  famous  pupils,  who  contributed  so 
much to Athens’ defeat and the Thirty’s horrors’.38 According to 
Fisher, Plato cunningly depicts Alcibiades in such a way as to 
distance Socrates  from Alcibiades,  Critias,  Charmides and the 
traitors of 411 and 404. These tyrannical types sought Socrates 
as a bedfellow, as it were, but Socrates rejected their advances. 
He cannot therefore be condemned as a corrupter of the youth 
or enemy of the state. One might develop such a ‘democratic’ 
reading even further than Fisher does. Socrates’ various acts of 
hybris through the evening could be seen as acts of hybris against 
types  like  Alcibiades  and  Agathon,  the  influential  and  self-
important kaloi kagathoi. Socrates here would become a kind of 
demotic  hero  and  could  be  likened,  say,  to  Aristophanes’ 
Philocleon.  In  the  Wasps,  Philocleon  outdoes  the  aristocratic 
symposiasts in hybris, as he gratuitously insults the other guests, 
farts out loud, mocks the proceedings. Afterwards, he wanders 
drunk through the street,  shouting, dancing,  brawling, beating 
passers-by.39 As with many other ‘comic heroes’,  Philocleon’s 
37 Nussbaum’s criticism of Socrates for a failure to love the individual was 
applied to Plato himself by G. Vlastos in an influential article (‘The Individual 
as  an  Object  of  Love  in  Plato’,  in  Platonic Studies,  ed.  by  N.  Tuanna 
(University Park: Penn State Press, 1973), pp.11-24); and by K. Dover, Plato:  
Symposium (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p.113.
38 Fisher, p. 464
39 See esp. Xanthias’ speech (Wasps,  1300-1325) describing how Philocleon 
was among the company ‘the most hybristic by far’  ( 
, 1303).
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assertion of the power of the demos must have been cheered by 
many  in  Aristophanes’  audience:  through  Philocleon,  the 
common  man  triumphs,  even  in  the  symposium,  that  most 
aristocratic of arenas. Socrates is, of course, not so boorish as 
Philocleon.  Yet,  he  too  appears  as  a  member  of  the  great 
unwashed demos: barefoot stonemason, military hero of Athens, 
throughout the party he slyly snubs his social ‘superiors’. And 
what greater triumph than to see Alcibiades himself tarred with 
his own brush, complaining peevishly of suffering  hybris  at the 
hands of a poor man?
All  these  approaches  have  an  element  of  truth,  so 
suggestive are these final  passages of the  Symposium.  And yet, 
one feels that there must be more. Again, Alcibiades’ speech is a 
generalizing one, and seems therefore to call for a more general 
interpretation. What follows takes its main inspiration from the 
notion of a general  Platonic ‘revaluation of values’,  though it 
focuses  primarily  on  the  Symposium itself.  Namely,  Socrates’ 
hybris is not of the traditional variety, represented by Alcibiades 
himself, or by the dark horse of the  Phaedrus.  Rather, this is a 
new form of hybris, a philosophical hybris that represents a larger 
moral shift.  Here  hybris  might represent the dishonouring and 
even  rejection  of  the  values  that  someone  like  Alcibiades 
embodies—including  traditional  hybris  itself.  That  is,  Socrates 
rejects  wealth,  power,  status,  prestige,  intelligence,  physical 
beauty and strength, youth, as absolute goods. These regain their 
value, and even their existence, only when placed in relation to a 
highest,  and eternal  source of value. Such a Platonic idealism 
finds one particular application in the themes of the Symposium. 
In the  Symposium,  the ideal  philosopher would subordinate all 
conventional desires to one single, overriding eros. But to desire 
is to honour, and not to desire is to dishonour. Therefore, there 
is  a  new  form  of  hybris to  complement  the  new  ethic  of 
philosophical  eros.  Socrates  hybristes and  Socrates  erastes are 
different aspects of the one character.
Nietzsche’s phrase ‘the revaluation of values’ has often 
been  appropriated  to  describe  aspects  of  Socratic  and  post-
Socratic  movements,  and  it  is  invoked  by  Fisher  also  in  his 
analysis of  hybris.40 The debt is rarely acknowledged, however; 
40 Nietzsche’s phrase is  Umwerthung aller Werthe (see e.g.  Götzen-Dämmerung, 
Foreword). Surveying archaic and classical Greek literature as a whole, Fisher 
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Nietzsche,  similarly,  is  not always open in  admitting his  own 
debt to classical authors like Plato and Thucydides for this, one 
of his central ideas. There are several passages that depict Plato’s 
Socrates  as  ‘revaluing  values’  for  the  purposes  of  asserting  a 
philosophical  idealism.  Most  obvious  are  the  remarks  of 
Callicles  in the  Gorgias:  here Socrates defends the proposition 
that  ‘it  is  better  to  suffer  justice  than  commit  it’.  Callicles 
responds that if Socrates were to persuade others of this, then 
‘the  life  of  mankind  would  be  overturned’.41 Other  salient 
passages treating a transfiguration of morals are in Thucydides 
and the Republic. Thucydides’ famous description of the stasis in 
Corcyra is a portrait of how party-pressure—the will to assert 
one’s  political  agenda  regardless  of  other  loyalties  or 
considerations—brought  a  coarsening  of  attitudes  and 
language.42 Plato  offers  a  variation  on  this  theme  in  his 
description  of  the  stasis  between  oligarchical  and  democratic 
elements in both city and soul. Here, democratic individualism 
appropriates  the  language  of  arete  in  service  of  a  crass  self-
indulgence:  hybris  is  termed  ‘good breeding’,  license  (anarchia) 
‘freedom’, prodigality ‘liberality’, and shamelessness ‘manliness’ 
(Rep. 560d-561a). On the other hand, any form of self-restraint 
(aidos,  sophrosune,  metriotes)  is  cast  aside  as  ‘foolishness’, 
‘cowardice’, or ‘boorishness’. Here, as in Thucydides, the main 
concludes: ‘It remains true, however, and bears repeating, that the term hybris  
itself is nowhere “revalued”, explicitly justified as an ideal, without important 
qualifications. Tyrants, comic heroes, “immoralist” philosophers or sophists, 
and representatives of imperialist states do not seem to assert that  hybris  is 
justifiable,  as they may say that tyranny, injustice,  or  arche are  appropriate 
goals for “real men” or men or states that obey “the laws of nature”’ (p. 123; 
cf.  p.  107-8).  Fisher does suggest a revaluing of sorts in middle and later 
Platonic  dialogues  (especially  the  Phaedrus),  by  which  hybris  signifies  the 
dominance of the appetite element in the soul over reason and   (see 
esp. pp. 467-92, 499). Fisher does not extend this analysis to the Symposium, 
however,  not  recognizing that  this  dialogue at  least  seems to attribute an 
idealized hybris to Socrates. 
41 Pl. Grg. 481b10-c4. Alcibiades also hints at the notion that Socrates would 
‘overturn the world’, when he warns the symposiasts not to credit Socrates, 
for  in  fact  everything  is  exactly  opposite  to  whatever  Socrates  may have 
asserted in his speech: ‘Are you convinced by anything that Socrates just said? 
Don’t you know that in everything the case is the opposite to what he would 
say?’ (Symp. 214c8-d4:          
          .
42 Thuc. 3.82
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cause of this perversion of language is party-pressure. But it also 
derives  from sheer  self-assertion,  and  hence,  ultimately,  from 
the compulsion of an inner eros tyrannos—that is, from the desire 
to  satisfy  all  one’s  appetites  to  the  full,  without  fear  of 
punishment, social censure or the pangs of conscience. Indeed, 
this  notion  that  eros  can  distort  language  and  one’s  whole 
disposition is foreshadowed in Socrates’ remarks in Republic 474. 
Here, as in  Republic 8, Socrates comments on the phenomenon 
of  ‘talking  something  up’  and  of  how lovers,  their  judgment 
clouded  by  infatuation,  will  find  some way  of  praising  their 
beloved. Thus, due to the distorting influence of passion, the 
large,  hooked  nose  is  praised  as  ‘regal’  or  ‘aquiline’;  a  short, 
pudgy  figure  is  termed  ‘tidy’,  while  the  figure  of  the  broad 
behemoth  is  beautified  by  euphemisms  like  ‘generous’, 
‘curvaceous’, or ‘ample’.43
This latter discussion of  eros  is, in fact, a preliminary to 
the assertion that the ideal philosopher will desire all types of 
learning. Just as the erotic are attracted by all beautiful bodies, 
and  lovers  of  honour  desire  to  be  honoured  in  every  way 
possible,  so  the  philosopher  or  lover  of  wisdom  will  seek 
knowledge in  every  source.  The contention in  Republic 474 is 
that  eros and knowledge need  not be related as two scales in a 
balance. When one scale rises, the other must fall, but this is not 
the  case  with  philosophical  desire  and  knowledge.  Subjective 
desire need not lead to a perversion of attitude and terminology, 
but can, on the contrary, purify and deepen them. Knowledge is 
not at all the opposite of desire, but a consequent of it. This 
point is commonly made about Platonic ethics, but it should be 
applied  also  to  the  interpretation  of  Socrates’  speech  in  the 
Symposium.
Here,  Socrates  and  Diotima  introduce  a  series  of 
reversals that reappropriate more conventional notions for their 
own purposes.  Namely,  the previous speakers—as many lyric 
43 Pl.  Rep. 474d7-a2; the examples (apart from the ‘regal’ nose) are my own, 
given  that  Plato’s  Greek  phrases  have  little  resonance  in  contemporary 
English. ‘Talking something up’ is my very approximate translation of 
, used in both Rep. 474d-e and 560c-561a. Liddell & Scott’s Greek-
English Lexicon (9th edition) lists various meanings of the word: ‘to call by 
endearing names [...] to call something bad by a fair name, to gloss over [...] 
reversely, call something good by a bad name’. 
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poets in the Greek tradition—have spoken of the great power 
of eros. Eros is a god that sweeps over the lover with a ferocious 
power that  none can resist.  Under the  influence of  eros,  the 
lover becomes a slave to his beloved,  and is  driven half-mad 
with longing and infatuation. For Socrates and Diotima,  eros is 
not a god, but a daimon or demi-god. It is not primarily sexual in 
nature, but first and foremost intellectual. And far from being a 
tyrannical force that drives the lover willy-nilly, eros is in fact the 
great  liberator,  opening  human  beings  to  a  greater 
consciousness. For Socrates’ eros ferries human beings from the 
‘poverty’  (Penia)  of  bodily  existence—confined  by  the 
immediacies of sense-perception and appetite—to the ‘wealth’ 
(Poros)  of  a  purely  intellectual  life,  which is  not  so  confined. 
Here, in this realm of Forms, the mind may become ‘in a way all 
things’ and may, somehow, contemplate all being.44 So too, eros  
properly  trained  will  be  directed  towards  progressively  more 
universal  objects,  yielding  a  progressive  expansion  of  one’s 
awareness. From the beauty of some one body, the inductee will 
come to recognize the beauty of all bodies, of laws, of whole 
institutions  and  cultures,  of  individual  sciences,  and  of 
knowledge as a whole. Then, perhaps, he will see the beauty of 
something  far  more  miraculous—that  ‘great  sea  of  beauty’, 
which  Socrates  mentions  so  tantalizingly,  the  paradigm  of 
Beauty  itself  shining  forth  unchanged  in  an  unchangeable 
perfection, abiding even as all other beauties change and fade.45 
Repeatedly and emphatically, Socrates argues that eros is 
in truth the desire for this eternal realm. All living things desire 
the  eternal  with  varying  degrees  of  intensity.  The  body 
demonstrates  this  desire  in  the  sheer  fact  of  survival,  of 
maintaining its identity through time. Animals desire the eternal 
44 The mind knows ‘all things’: Meno 81c5-d5 (   
); cf. Aristotle, De an. 431b21 (      , 
405b15-17,  429a18-21.  The  Platonic  philosopher  is  great-souled,  and 
contemplates ‘the whole’, all time and all being:  Rep. 486a1-11; cf. Shorey’s 
Loeb-edition of the  Republic 486a9 for many more references in Plato (incl. 
Theaet.  173e-174e)  and  others.  Such  passages  suggest  that  for  Plato,  the 
knowledge of universals somehow includes knowledge of particulars, and so to 
know a universal is to know all the particulars subsumed under it; if so, then 
Plato’s Forms might be partially likened to Hegel’s concrete universal, and 
the contemplation of all universals would constitute omniscience. 
45 Symp. 209e5-212a7 
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through biological reproduction: children, grandchildren, great-
grand-children  prolong  one’s  existence  through  many 
generations, and so can afford an immortality of sorts.46 At a 
higher level of intensity, some human beings gain a substitute 
eternity  by  producing  spiritual  ‘offspring’—reputations,  art-
works,  states,  ways  of  life,  philosophies  that  survive  their 
authors’  passing.47 To  live  beyond  death,  to  transcend  the 
individual  life-span  are  to  Socrates  an  image  of,  or  an 
approximation  to,  eternal  being,  for  eternity  is  the  utter 
transcendence of  time itself.48 In  this  way,  he  argues  that  all 
conventional forms of  eros are in fact lesser, shadowy instances 
of  the  true  eros,  which  is  the  desire  ‘to  be  with’  the  eternal, 
eternally. Here indeed is a radical revaluation of the word  eros. 
Socrates’ ideas, if followed, would not only overturn the life of 
his  Greek  contemporaries;  they  are  a  perennial  challenge  to 
conventional  moral  hierarchies,  a  challenge  even  to  natural 
instinct itself.
Socrates’ ‘revaluation’ of the nature and ideality of  eros, 
is, I propose, complemented by a revision of the meaning and 
value of hybris. The desire for and intuition of the eternal results 
in a  relatively careless attitude towards temporal externals  per se. 
Socratic  eros  leads  to  a  relative  dishonouring  of  goods  like 
friendship,  family,  wealth,  fame,  power,  even  intellectual 
accomplishment. None of these goods are absolute; in contrast 
to the tremendous vision of Beauty itself, none can satisfy one’s 
truest  longings.  Therefore,  the  Platonic  Socrates  would 
relentlessly subordinate temporal  goods to the highest  human 
46 See  esp.  Symp.  206c6-8,  206e7-207a4,  and  207c9-208b6  for  the  general 
principle that the endurance of temporal entities (whether animal species, the 
body, emotions, ideas and other elements of the soul) represents not true 
identity, but rather the replacement of the similar by the similar—parent by 
child, muscle by muscle, emotion by emotion, concept by concept. Sex and 
procreation, then, are truly ‘divine affairs’ ( )  because they 
are ‘means by which the mortal participates in immortality’ (Symp. 208b2-4). 
Compare this remarkable ‘revaluation’ of desire, sub specie aeternitatis, with the 
lyric  poet  Archilochus’  so-called ‘Last Tango on Paros’,  where sex is  also 
termed ‘the divine thing’ (  , fr. S478a15), though for more 
obvious reasons. 
47 Pl. Symp. 208c1-209e4
48 In  this  reading,  Socrates’  argument  seems  consistent  with  the  later 
definition of time in the Timaeus as the ‘moving image of eternity’ (37d).
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good—the  transforming  intuition  of  the  Forms.  Here, 
Alcibiades becomes representative of all lesser temporal values: 
handsome, strong, tall, athletic, eloquent, charismatic, intelligent, 
he appears in the Symposium in January 416 at the pinnacle of his 
worldly  success,  and  yet  somehow destitute  of  a  deeper  joy. 
Socrates  will  treat  this  Alcibiades  as  a  partner  in  a  shared 
philosophical  pursuit.  But  if  Alcibiades  demands  to  be 
worshipped  as  a  god,  as  the  beloved  might  conventionally 
expect to be, then Socrates would set him aside as an obstacle to 
wisdom.  Hence,  Socrates  does  set  Alcibiades  aside.  From 
Alcibiades’  perspective,  this  is  dishonour—hybris.  From 
Socrates’ perspective, it is just treatment, and a consequence of 
Socrates’  superior  insight  and  temperance  (sophrosune). 
Therefore,  Socrates’  hybris  against  Alcibiades is  not  simply an 
isolated  private  affair,  some obscure  lovers’  quarrel.49 Rather, 
their  unusual  relationship  becomes  emblematic  of  the  ideal 
moral ordering that Socrates proposes in his speech about  eros. 
That is,  Socrates’  hybris  towards Alcibiades is an image of the 
Platonic subordination of the conventional to the philosophical, 
the temporal to the eternal, the particular to the universal. 
If so, then Alcibiades does indeed speak the truth about 
Socrates, but he himself may not realize the full import of his 
words.  Socrates  has  indeed  committed  hybris against  him,  as 
against Charmides, Euthydemus, Agathon and many others, for 
Socrates would honour the temporal, particular, contingent only 
when they  participate  in  values  or  truths  that  are  absolute—
eternal, universal, necessary. This aspect of Socratic thinking is 
well  expressed  by  Alcibiades’  rich  image:  Socrates  is the 
philosophical satyr who wanders through the world, filled with a 
spirit  of  irreverent  laughter,  caring  little  for  physical  beauty, 
wealth  or  social  status  per  se.50 Socrates  cares  very  little  for 
49 Contrary to Fisher’s claim that ‘the main hybris committed by this mixture 
of satyr and philosophical near-god consists, put crudely, in not having sexual 
relations with those boys of whom he had seemed to want to be the lover’ (p. 
463).
50 Symp.  216d5-e6. For similar language (quoted above, n.1), see Diotima’s 
speech, 210b4-6 ( towards the particular) and 210c3-6 (those 
who  have  seen  that  Beauty  consider  bodily  beauty  a  ‘small  thing’). 
Apollodorus is  also depicted as gratuitously denigrating his companion, as 
well  as  the rich and the money-makers,  as  worthless  in  comparison with 
Socrates (173c2-e3). Indeed, Apollodorus is about to launch into an elenchus, 
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conventional sensibilities in themselves. He  will invite his own 
guest to Agathon’s house;  he  will arrive late without apology; 
and he will disregard the rules of the party to give a speech in his 
own idiosyncratic  style.  This  Socrates  seems actively  to  tease 
conventional sensibilities, as if with the view that a little gentle 
hybris—in the form of a ribbing, satire or the elenchus—can sting 
the complacent into new trains of thought. Only thinking can 
redeem conventional  values and set one on the upward path. 
Socrates’ hybris, therefore, serves philosophical eros, just as much 
as it is a consequence of it.
And yet, because it has a different origin, this ‘revalued’ 
or philosophical  hybris  has a very different tone from the more 
traditional variety. Socrates himself is depicted as quite gracious, 
self-effacing  and  considerate.  Here  is  no  Meidias,  Conon, 
Alcibiades, Cambyses, Agamemnon, or ‘gift-devouring king’—
typical champions of the old, worldly, violent  hybris.  Different 
origins might explain this difference in tone. The  hybris  of the 
new philosophical  ‘aristocrat’  is  not  brought  out  by  wine  or 
power,  but  by  insight  into  an  order  that  transcends  any 
individual;  transcends even the temporal  realm. Tempered by 
such enlightenment, this new philosophical hybris is hybris in the 
sense that  it  rises  from a tremendous intellectual  energy,  and 
expresses  itself  in  the  relative  dishonouring  of  conventional 
values, and of conventional people. But it differs markedly from 
conventional  hybris  in  that  it  is  gentle  rather  than  violent, 
thoughtful  rather  than boorish.  It  asserts  itself  by  persuasion 
rather than force. All this makes the new hybris, paradoxically, a 
just  one,  and  it  can  rightfully  assert  itself  vis-à-vis  the 
conventional  hybris  of  people  like  Alcibiades. Socrates’  hybris  
towards  the  hybristic  Alcibiades  illustrates  this  assertion  of  a 
new moral stance that is unapologetically idealistic. And so, in 
the context of a Platonic ‘revision of values’, Alcibiades is right 
to accuse Socrates of hybris—and right also to be the victim of it 
in its new incarnation.
Socratic-style: like Socrates with Agathon, he is in danger of forgetting about 
the proposed speech-making. But again, like Socrates, he is stopped by his 
companion, who does not want any strife (173e1-6).
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